Once more Foreign Affairs, arguably the most prestigious journal on international and comparative politics being published today, and its sister Council on Foreign Relations site have provided some really great material. Consider:
Robert H. Pelletreau "Transformation in the Middle East: Comparing the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain" Foreign Affairs (Thursday, February 24th, 2011) - Pelletreau is arguably one of the most qualified people on earth to speak on the current disruptions - he has served as US Ambassador to Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain respectively under both Democratic and Republican administrations, and then served from 1994 to 1997 as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs - he is, in other words, the real thing, and this article gives us a subtle, if admittedly not game-changing overview. What is arguably most important is that he makes an endorsement of the US's handling of the situation so far (though this is hardly surprising - press handling and delicate stepping make the US's behavior looks very much like late-1980s/early-1990s American diplomacy so far.
Bernard Gwertzman interviews F. Gregory Gause, III "Is Bahrain's Regime Next to Fall?" Council on Foreign Affairs (Friday, February 18th, 2011) - In depth, easy to understand, really a tremendous article.
Robert Zaretsky "Egypt and the Long Duree'" Foreign Affairs (Thursday, February 10th, 2011) - A brief explanation of why it is, frankly, too soon to call the outcome of events in Egypt, citing the natural conservatism of political culture (if not politics) in the Mediterranean basin.
James D. Le Sueur "Postcolonial Time Disorder: Egypt and the Middle East, Stuck in the Past" Foreign Affairs (Monday, February 14th, 2011) - A great article positing a model in which dictator's blindness in the Middle East is understood as a cultural bias of the surviving elites of the first post-colonial generations that still rule many of these states. Introduced me to the term "hegemonic nationalism" as well - going to need to look that up, see how it is used elsewhere. Regardless, probably a good read for anyone who studies nondemocratic post-colonial states.
Clement M. Henry and Robert Springbourg "A Tunisian Solution for Egypt's Military: Why Egypt's Military Will Not Be Able to Govern." Foreign Affairs (Monday, February 21st, 2011) - Another great one - here Henry and Springbourg argue (1) strongly in favor of civilianization of Egypt and (2) argue it is inevitable, despite the military's significant political and economic power base.
"Issue Guide: Arab World Protests" Council on Foreign Affairs (running updates, last updated February 22nd, 2011) - A clearinghouse of articles from around the net that are "must reads" - I haven't read them all, but recognize some heavy hitters and shall return.
Suzanne Maloney interviewing Roya Wolverson "Iran's Protests and Economic Realities" Council on Foreign Affairs (Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011) - Some comparisons with Egypt and a description of the growing strength of the Revolutionary Guard, as well as some other interesting policies and the population bulge.
Showing posts with label regime change. Show all posts
Showing posts with label regime change. Show all posts
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Monday, February 21, 2011
Four Choices Emergent
If there were any real doubt left, today it became clear that there were, and are, significantly diverging behavioral patterns emerging among the established elites of different greater Middle Eastern states experiencing the onset of radical disestablishmentarianism. At least four strategies, as far as I can tell, have emerged:
1. Measured response and refusal to conciliate or arbitrate until very late
2. Early and extensive conciliatory response with focus on key factions
3. Measured response and withdrawal with open door for conciliation, at least formally
4. Overwhelming use of force
The first of these, which we saw in both Tunisia and Egypt, is as much a sign of "dictator's blindness" (the tendency of autocrats to believe they are both more legitimate than they are and that their regime is more stable than, in fact, it is) as anything else. Two autocrats and their cliques ultimately lose power because they refuse to accept the possibility of taking fairly radical reforms early in a conflict AND because they failed to learn the morally dubious but functionally true lesson of the 1989 Revolutions - you cannot expect to take half measures and crush massive, popular, radicalism without the use of overwhelming military capacity a la Tiananmen. Had Ben Ali or Mubarak elected to either meaningfully undertake even a few reforms early they would probably be in office for years longer - equally, had they called out the military early enough, keeping it properly in check, of course (e.g. using only the most self-disciplined troops and police) the same would likely be true. But they elected not to respond as such and new regimes are being knitted together in these states.
The second option, that of an early and extensive conciliatory response focusing on, frankly, corporatist buy-offs of critical factions, both pro- and, when possible, anti-regime in nature, is probably being best used by King Abdullah II Jordan, though certainly the Yemenese are undertaking some similar strategies. Increase subsidies, increase pay for your civil service and military, decrease taxes on whatever goods are most important at this moment (e.g. foodstuffs in Jordan - I think, by the way, that we'll look back at rising food prices as a huge part of this movement in only a few years, if not months), and so forth - it isn't cynical, it is logical. By co-opting critical factions many regimes have been saved, autocratic and democratic.
The third option is that which Bahrain seems to be taking, though I'm not sure it isn't too early to tell - specifically, it involves cracking down in waves, withdrawing, and leaving the option of negotiation open. I don't believe this is a good strategy - each time the Bahraini security infrastructure withdraws from public squares the protests rise again, resurgent - I am reminded again of 1989 when the protests in Beijing, which lasted ages, only ended when that fundamental logic of all infantrymen with a lick of sense, "hold the ground" kicked in and the People's Liberation Army decided to take public spaces formally for an extended period of time. Allowing the opposition to reform after each of these has allowed it to become more robust, better capable of coordinating, and frankly, more determined it seems as they gradually acquire shared experiences, "battle hardiness" and a collective identity.
Finally, a number of regimes are pulling out the stops - Iran's ruling clique roaring in parliament for the opposition to be killed - Algeria's security instruments actively preventing the emergence of large-scale public protests rather than responding to their effects (I am reminded, with a shiver, of Madison's warnings in The Federalist Papers) - and now the unquestionable over-response (virtually regardless of your moral compass) of the Qadaffi regime in Libya as the dictator has begun an air war on his own people (though, admittedly, one which might prove his downfall as his own diplomatic corps abandon him in droves and NATO states begin debating a no-fly zone) which some of his own pilots are refusing to carry out. This latter category, this is the lesson learned by so many autocratic regimes in the post-1989 world - force used en masse by a loyal security apparatus can, essentially, end most popular uprisings if it is used early enough.
1. Measured response and refusal to conciliate or arbitrate until very late
2. Early and extensive conciliatory response with focus on key factions
3. Measured response and withdrawal with open door for conciliation, at least formally
4. Overwhelming use of force
The first of these, which we saw in both Tunisia and Egypt, is as much a sign of "dictator's blindness" (the tendency of autocrats to believe they are both more legitimate than they are and that their regime is more stable than, in fact, it is) as anything else. Two autocrats and their cliques ultimately lose power because they refuse to accept the possibility of taking fairly radical reforms early in a conflict AND because they failed to learn the morally dubious but functionally true lesson of the 1989 Revolutions - you cannot expect to take half measures and crush massive, popular, radicalism without the use of overwhelming military capacity a la Tiananmen. Had Ben Ali or Mubarak elected to either meaningfully undertake even a few reforms early they would probably be in office for years longer - equally, had they called out the military early enough, keeping it properly in check, of course (e.g. using only the most self-disciplined troops and police) the same would likely be true. But they elected not to respond as such and new regimes are being knitted together in these states.
The second option, that of an early and extensive conciliatory response focusing on, frankly, corporatist buy-offs of critical factions, both pro- and, when possible, anti-regime in nature, is probably being best used by King Abdullah II Jordan, though certainly the Yemenese are undertaking some similar strategies. Increase subsidies, increase pay for your civil service and military, decrease taxes on whatever goods are most important at this moment (e.g. foodstuffs in Jordan - I think, by the way, that we'll look back at rising food prices as a huge part of this movement in only a few years, if not months), and so forth - it isn't cynical, it is logical. By co-opting critical factions many regimes have been saved, autocratic and democratic.
The third option is that which Bahrain seems to be taking, though I'm not sure it isn't too early to tell - specifically, it involves cracking down in waves, withdrawing, and leaving the option of negotiation open. I don't believe this is a good strategy - each time the Bahraini security infrastructure withdraws from public squares the protests rise again, resurgent - I am reminded again of 1989 when the protests in Beijing, which lasted ages, only ended when that fundamental logic of all infantrymen with a lick of sense, "hold the ground" kicked in and the People's Liberation Army decided to take public spaces formally for an extended period of time. Allowing the opposition to reform after each of these has allowed it to become more robust, better capable of coordinating, and frankly, more determined it seems as they gradually acquire shared experiences, "battle hardiness" and a collective identity.
Finally, a number of regimes are pulling out the stops - Iran's ruling clique roaring in parliament for the opposition to be killed - Algeria's security instruments actively preventing the emergence of large-scale public protests rather than responding to their effects (I am reminded, with a shiver, of Madison's warnings in The Federalist Papers) - and now the unquestionable over-response (virtually regardless of your moral compass) of the Qadaffi regime in Libya as the dictator has begun an air war on his own people (though, admittedly, one which might prove his downfall as his own diplomatic corps abandon him in droves and NATO states begin debating a no-fly zone) which some of his own pilots are refusing to carry out. This latter category, this is the lesson learned by so many autocratic regimes in the post-1989 world - force used en masse by a loyal security apparatus can, essentially, end most popular uprisings if it is used early enough.
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