News and a flag

The 1951 Libyan flag currently being used by "Free" Libyan forces

(Image by Martin Grieve on the Flags of the World Website)

I just wanted to share a few stories, etc. that I have found which I thought might be interesting at one or another level.  In no particular order: 

"Moroccan single mother burns herself in protest" Reuters (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Beyond the tragedy, this is significant because it is a case of self-immolation by a woman, the first so far in the 2011 disturbances, but also because it happened in Morocco, a nation-state that so far has seemed more immune from disruption than many of its regional peers. 

Martin Chulov "Libyan city dubbed 'Free Bengazi' as anti-Gaddafi forces take control" The Guardian (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Self-definition of rebel forces seems to be emerging in Libya - the use of "Free" to indicate which cowboy hats rebels are wearing, the use of the pre-Gaddahi regime Libyan flag - nothing too dramatic, but interesting.  A lot here, including some clear evidence that the military is fractured and that mercs are in situ. 

Faith Karimi "Cameroonians plan anti-government protests" CNN (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Potentially very important - snowball/demonstration effect in an Muslim-minority, Sub-Saharan African state.  Something to watch carefully. 

Muhammad Jamjoom "Yemen president calls for new national unity government" CNN (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Yemen keeps heating up even as Saleh keeps trying to negotiate his continued preeminence. 

"Egypt swears in new ministers" Al Jazeera (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - The headline is less important, possibly, than the fact that several out-regimers are sworn into the new cabinet - prompting the disdain of disestablishmentarians, including the important Muslim Brotherhood. 

"Yemen MPs resign over violence" Al Jazeera (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Splits in the ruling party. . .  

"Bahrain frees political prisoners" Al Jazeera (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - About 50, not quite half are Shi'a actvitists - but it is a move? 

"Saudi king announces new benefits" Al Jazeera (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Totaling about US$ 11 billion - another attempt at the bribery method - and it might work, given that the Kingdom is comparatively stable still.  I look forward to reading some much more in-depth coverage of this in the next couple of days. 

Jacqueline Head "The Arab world's 1989 revolution?" Al Jazeera (Wednesday, February 2nd, 2011) - I missed this one when it came out (cursed hospitals with no internet) but it definitely is worth a look-see - not in-depth, but penetrating discussion. 

Andres Cala "Europe rethinks dependence on Libyan oil" Christian Science Monitor (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Tardy.  

Peter Grier "Why Qaddafi is losing parts of Libya" Christian Science Monitor (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - A geography lesson on Libya that is very important, though perhaps a little too apocalyptic in comparing Libya to Yugoslavia when Czechoslovakia might just as easily be an alternative.  Of course, so might Libya. 

Jane Arraf "Iraq attempts to diffuse huge protest planned for Friday" Christian Science Monitor (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Demonstration effect in a state that is already transitioning to democracy. . . 

Deborah Amos "Nearby Uprisings Stoke Saudi Political Passions" NPR (Wednesday, Februrary 23rd, 2011) - A really, really great article, very nuanced, absolutely a must read to get a handle on what is happening in the Kingdom - also, it quotes a very, very different number on the King's benefit plan: US$ 35 billion - wow. 

"Don't count your dominoes: Will other north African countries explode too?" The Economist (Thursday, February 17th, 2011) - A discussion of the gravity factors that might prevent the entire subregion of North Africa from following suit with Tunisia and Egypt - and a total misuse of the concept of domino theory.  Clearly, tomorrow, I have a blog entry to write. 

"Oil pressure rising" The Economist (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Oil prices are gonna' rise, probably a lot, in the next few months (and probably years) in response to real and perceived threats to the supply.  Geopolitics may finally make that electric car and public transportation something to consider, SUV moms.

"Will Arab revolt spread to Palestinian territories?" BBC (Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011) - Complex interstate politics are slamming head-first into the already recently destabilized Palestinian Authority, making this an incredibly important question with no clear answer . . . and few prospects of a happy (immediate, at least) outcome. 

Okay, that should sate for a little while.  I am turning in.  Night kids. 

Four Choices Emergent

If there were any real doubt left, today it became clear that there were, and are, significantly diverging behavioral patterns emerging among the established elites of different greater Middle Eastern states experiencing the onset of radical disestablishmentarianism.  At least four strategies, as far as I can tell, have emerged:

1. Measured response and refusal to conciliate or arbitrate until very late
2. Early and extensive conciliatory response with focus on key factions
3. Measured response and withdrawal with open door for conciliation, at least formally
4. Overwhelming use of force

The first of these, which we saw in both Tunisia and Egypt, is as much a sign of "dictator's blindness" (the tendency of autocrats to believe they are both more legitimate than they are and that their regime is more stable than, in fact, it is) as anything else.  Two autocrats and their cliques ultimately lose power because they refuse to accept the possibility of taking fairly radical reforms early in a conflict AND because they failed to learn the morally dubious but functionally true lesson of the 1989 Revolutions - you cannot expect to take half measures and crush massive, popular, radicalism without the use of overwhelming military capacity a la Tiananmen.  Had Ben Ali or Mubarak elected to either meaningfully undertake even a few reforms early they would probably be in office for years longer - equally, had they called out the military early enough, keeping it properly in check, of course (e.g. using only the most self-disciplined troops and police) the same would likely be true.  But they elected not to respond as such and new regimes are being knitted together in these states.

The second option, that of an early and extensive conciliatory response focusing on, frankly, corporatist buy-offs of critical factions, both pro- and, when possible, anti-regime in nature, is probably being best used by King Abdullah II Jordan, though certainly the Yemenese are undertaking some similar strategies.  Increase subsidies, increase pay for your civil service and military, decrease taxes on whatever goods are most important at this moment (e.g. foodstuffs in Jordan - I think, by the way, that we'll look back at rising food prices as a huge part of this movement in only a few years, if not months), and so forth - it isn't cynical, it is logical.  By co-opting critical factions many regimes have been saved, autocratic and democratic.

The third option is that which Bahrain seems to be taking, though I'm not sure it isn't too early to tell - specifically, it involves cracking down in waves, withdrawing, and leaving the option of negotiation open.   I don't believe this is a good strategy - each time the Bahraini security infrastructure withdraws from public squares the protests rise again, resurgent - I am reminded again of 1989 when the protests in Beijing, which lasted ages, only ended when that fundamental logic of all infantrymen with a lick of sense, "hold the ground" kicked in and the People's Liberation Army decided to take public spaces formally for an extended period of time.  Allowing the opposition to reform after each of these has allowed it to become more robust, better capable of coordinating, and frankly, more determined it seems as they gradually acquire shared experiences, "battle hardiness" and a collective identity.

Finally, a number of regimes are pulling out the stops - Iran's ruling clique roaring in parliament for the opposition to be killed - Algeria's security instruments actively preventing the emergence of large-scale public protests rather than responding to their effects (I am reminded, with a shiver, of Madison's warnings in The Federalist Papers) - and now the unquestionable over-response (virtually regardless of your moral compass) of the Qadaffi regime in Libya as the dictator has begun an air war on his own people (though, admittedly, one which might prove his downfall as his own diplomatic corps abandon him in droves and NATO states begin debating a no-fly zone) which some of his own pilots are refusing to carry out.  This latter category, this is the lesson learned by so many autocratic regimes in the post-1989 world - force used en masse by a loyal security apparatus can, essentially, end most popular uprisings if it is used early enough.